University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2005

Reconsidering the DMCA
R. Polk Wagner
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons,
Internet Law Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Science and Technology
Law Commons

Repository Citation
Wagner, R. Polk, "Reconsidering the DMCA" (2005). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 740.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/740

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

(6)WAGNERG2

12/1/2005 10:35 AM

RECONSIDERING THE DMCA
R. Polk Wagner*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................1108

II. THE DIGITAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT ........................1111
A. Equilibrium at the Law-Software Interface ...............1113
B. Dynamic Effects ..........................................................1114
C. A Few Implications of Software Regulation ...............1117
1. Software-Based Regulation Lacks Regulatory
Safety Valves........................................................1118
2. Software Regulation Can Eliminate Marginal
Enforcement Costs ...............................................1118
3. Software Regulation May Scale Poorly ...............1119
D. Software Regulation and the Choice of Legal Rules:
Legal Preemption ........................................................1120
III. RECASTING THE DMCA ......................................................1122
A. Anticircumvention as Legal Preemption.....................1123
B. Encouragement and Suppression of Software
Regulation ...................................................................1125
C. The Plot Twist: How the DMCA Might
Limit DRM ..................................................................1125
IV. CONCLUSION: OR, HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE DMCA .......1127

* Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am indebted to the
participants of the 2005 IPIL/Houston Santa Fe Conference: Transactions, Information
and Emerging Law for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Kevin Goldman, Danielle
Rosenthal, Al Dong, and Ed Greenlee provided excellent research support.

1107

(6)WAGNERG2

1108

12/1/2005 10:35 AM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
I.

[42:4

INTRODUCTION

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)1 is a law that
nearly all legal scholars love to hate. As an industry-backed
response to the radical advances in digital technology and
network communications, the relevant terms of the law seem
broadly consistent with a view that the DMCA was intended to
protect the then-existing distribution models for copyrighted
content during an era of great transition.2 Put more directly,
Hollywood called for action, and Congress (and the President)
3
responded. Given this backdrop, the dominant understanding
among observers and commentators is that the DMCA altered
the inherent balance in copyright law between the copyright
owners (e.g., Hollywood) and the public (e.g., users or consumers)
in favor of the copyright owners.4
This Essay suggests that a reconceptualization of the DMCA
may be in order. Rather than looking at the anticircumvention
provisions of the DMCA as moving the fulcrum along the
copyright scale, I urge that we consider anticircumvention as a
5
law addressing the regulatory effects of technology. In the
anticircumvention provisions, Congress did not in fact alter the
balance between copyright owners and the public—very few
users of copyrighted goods are implicated by these rules.6

1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
2. See Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 502 (2003) (noting that supporters of the DMCA find the
provision “necessary to prevent unauthorized copying of copyrighted works in the digital
environment”).
3. See, e.g., John Schwartz, The Net Impact of the New Copyright Bill, WASH. POST,
May 18, 1998, Washington Business, at 27 (stating that the main supporters of the DMCA
are influential holders of copyrights in the entertainment industry).
4. The DMCA is heavily discussed in legal literature. Indeed, a recent Westlaw
search (in the “JLR” database) identified at least 53 articles using the term “DMCA” in
the title, and more than 1480 containing the term. Notwithstanding the volume, this
Author is aware of only two prominent defenses of the anticircumvention provisions of the
DMCA in print. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1636 (2001) (arguing in favor of
anticircumvention provisions); Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 163, 163–70 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002).
5. There are multiple provisions of the DMCA. This Essay is concerned only with
what are generally described as the “anticircumvention” and “copyright information
integrity” provisions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2000). For simplicity, references to the
DMCA or to “anticircumvention” should be understood to mean these sections of Title 17.
6. The DMCA’s anticircumvention rules broadly target the development, use, and
distribution of circumvention technologies. See infra Part III. A user who makes an
unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work (irrespective of whether that work was made
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Instead, Congress attempted to alter the balance between law
and software to respond to changes in the enforcement
environment by shifting the regulatory equilibrium back towards
the law. Therefore, these statutory provisions are perhaps the
first major example of an emerging feature of the modern
regulatory environment: the direct manipulation of regulatory
effects on software code via the law—or what I describe as “legal
preemption.”7
Legal preemption is a creature of the digital, networked
age—an era when goods, services, contracts, transactional
communications, and enforcement mechanisms are all just
collections of bits streaming through the global data networks. In
2005 it is a cliché to observe that software code has important
regulatory effects in this environment—as Lessig put so adroitly,
8
“code is law.”
It is well understood that the line between products and the
contracts that govern them, if there ever was a meaningful line,
is growing increasingly indistinct. It is further understood that
underlying legal concepts, such as property-like rights granted by
copyright law, are a foundation (albeit an important one) for the
product-contract transactions they support. But recognition does
not necessarily lead to real understanding. What is often lost in
the code-is-law perspective is the broader view of the modern
regulatory environment as equilibrium between the software and
9
legal “codes.” Under this view, law and technology are linked,
and it is the interaction between the two that determines the
regulatory effects.10
Recasting legal code and software code as complementary,
rather than as pure substitutes, leads to a number of important
observations. First, all discussion of regulation in the transaction
of digital goods must consider both legal and technological
dimensions of the enforcement equation; looking at law or
11
software in isolation simply misses the point. Second, the
development of regulatory policy in this new digital era offers

available via the circumvention of protection technology) is not legally affected by the
DMCA.
7. See discussion infra Part II.D.
8. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999)
(explaining that “the software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate
cyberspace as it is”).
9. See R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 465–77
(2005).
10. Id. at 468–70.
11. Id. at 465–74.
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both perils and promise.12 On the one hand, traditional
lawmakers control less of the regulatory framework than ever
before and lack important information about the true effects of
13
any legal intervention. On the other hand, legal code remains
enormously powerful, and the legislative and judicial options
have just expanded.14
It is on this last point that this Essay will focus. When law
and software together create the net regulatory environment,
policymakers will necessarily affect more than the simple
allocation of rights among competing parties (here, for example,
among content owners and the consuming public); they will also
affect the location of the law-software interface.15 In other words,
modern regulatory policy implicates both the substance and the
mechanism of regulation, and establishes the mixture between
16
legal code and software code. Thus enters the era of legal
preemption: the attempt to use legal mechanisms to directly alter
the law-software equilibrium. The DMCA’s anticircumvention
provisions, by squarely addressing the technological aspects of
the regulatory environment for copyrighted goods,17 represent a
first look at this brave new world of legal preemption.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II lays the foundation
by drawing on earlier related work to develop an analytic outline
for the digital regulatory environment. Rejecting the simplistic
mantra of code-is-law, this new analytic outline emphasizes the
dynamic and often unpredictable interaction between legal code
and software code, as well as the important implications of
different code mixtures. The analytic outline recognizes that
legal code and software code regulate in very different ways, with
different strengths, weaknesses, costs, and benefits. Indeed,
there are good reasons to believe that software regulation can
have undesirable effects, that it will substitute speed and
effectiveness for flexibility and critical enforcement “safety
valves.” A policy mandate for more law and less software is
perhaps best met via the use of legal preemption or the direct
alteration of the law-software regulatory interface.

12. Id. at 474–77.
13. Id.
14. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 8–17 (2004) (examining the expansion of copyright
protections).
15. Wagner, supra note 9, at 474; elaborated upon infra Part II.
16. Wagner, supra note 9, at 470–74; elaborated upon infra Part II.C.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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Part III picks up this thread and considers the DMCA’s
anticircumvention provisions as a form of legal preemption. That
is, given the context established in Part II, Congress’s choice of
statutory provisions is revealing: Rather than addressing the
users of infringing goods, Congress clearly sought to affect the
way that technology would be deployed. Importantly, the
anticircumvention provisions have multifaceted effects on
software regulation. In the near term, the law seeks to alter the
current law-software mixture: simultaneously encouraging some
forms of software code while banning others. The longer-term
effects are perhaps even more significant: the DMCA provisions
seem reasonably likely to reduce incentives for faster
development of technologies that would further alter the
equilibrium between law and software. That the DMCA might,
contrary to the conventional wisdom, actually limit the
development and deployment of “digital rights management”
(DRM) in the field of copyrighted goods could be its most
surprising, and important, regulatory legacy. Part IV concludes.
II. THE DIGITAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT18
This Part outlines a basic analytic framework for thinking
about the relationship between the two major regulatory modes
of the digital regulatory environment, law and software.19 The
core observation is that the law-software relationship is
primarily complementary—it is fundamentally additive rather
than subtractive. Put more simply, for a given regulatory
condition, the impact of law—cases, statutes, and so on—will
deeply influence the impact of software. Conceptually, the idea is
to think in terms of equilibrium, the natural resting point on the
law-software interface.
The analytic framework developed and explored here is
based on the following premises:
(a) Both legal code and software code have regulatory
effects;

18. This Part is based on a far more detailed treatment of this issue in an earlier
work. See Wagner, supra note 9.
19. As Lessig has aptly noted, social norms and the marketplace will have
important regulatory effects in cyberspace, as they do in realspace. Lawrence Lessig,
Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501,
507–10 (1999). For simplicity, and because the most interesting interaction for the
purposes of the online legal environment is that between law and software, the effects of
norms and the market will be noted less systematically, though their most important
effects will be described.
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(b) Legal effects and software effects are interrelated—a
change in one regulatory mode will affect the other (at least
over the medium-to-long term); and
(c) The total regulatory condition is the product of both
legal regulatory effects and software regulatory effects.

Figure 1, below, depicts the basic point here graphically.
Figure 1. The Law-Software Interface

Here, the axes represent the effects (or impact) of the two
regulatory modes, law (y-axis) and software (x-axis). A greater
regulatory effect means a greater impact on behavior; for
example, in a paradigmatic property rights case, greater
regulatory effect means greater protection to property owners.
The total regulatory effect is the area defined by the law-software
interface. Consider regulatory Condition A above, with a given
legal impact (here, 4), and software effect (here, 2). In the Figure
1 construct, the equilibrium condition is depicted as point a (2,4),
and the total regulatory effect is designated as 2 x 4 = 8.
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In the digital information goods context, Condition A in
Figure 1 represents the total appropriability provided to the
creator of an expressive intellectual good: the copyright. The
legal regulatory effects are established primarily by the
20
protections and limitations of Title 17 of the U.S. Code. The
technological effects include both the availability of protectionenhancing software, such as DRM, as well as the existence of
what Tim Wu describes as antiregulatory code—software that
undermines the appropriability of the work.21 What is important
for establishing the equilibrium, and thus total appropriation,
are the net effects of each regulatory system, law and software.
A. Equilibrium at the Law-Software Interface
Having established a basic understanding of the lawsoftware equilibrium through Figure 1, it becomes crucial to
understand the response mechanisms that produce this
condition. One important point is that the responses can be
expected to flow in both directions: Legal conditions will provoke
a technological response, and technological circumstances can
prompt legal changes. In the digital environment, neither legal
nor software code exists in a vacuum; their tight coexistence
creates a continual feedback loop.
Note that the equilibrium response posited here, for both law
and software, is driven by private cost-benefit considerations.22
Put most directly, equilibrium at the law-software interface is
determined by the contextual cost-benefit functions of the law
and software regulatory mechanisms. For example, given a legal
regulatory condition, greater software regulation will be deployed
(moving the equilibrium point to the right in Figure 1 above)
where it is cost effective to do so (where the gains outweigh the
costs). In the copyright context, evaluating this net legal impact
presents content owners with a choice concerning whether to
20. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332.
21. The canonical example, and the one discussed in detail by Wu, is peer-to-peer
software products, which allow for the easy—and only partially susceptible to
regulation—exchange of copyrighted goods (typically music or movies) between network
users. Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 726–45 (2003). Note that the
impact of both law and software must be considered on a net basis. Just as software in the
digital-goods context has both pro-protection and antiprotection effects, the Copyright Act
provides both legal protections and legal limitations. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (detailing a
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in a copyrighted work), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying
the “fair use” defense to unauthorized use of a copyrighted work).
22. It also represents average behavior. Obviously, in the absence of explicit
restrictions otherwise, individual responses to legal effects will vary. The figures here are
intended to convey the overall average response rather than suggest that all players will
behave the same.
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deploy software-based regulatory mechanisms. For example,
content owners could implement a strong regime of DRM,
seeking to prevent unauthorized access to the work via
technology. The use of this technique will increase the level of
protection, though it obviously comes with a series of related
costs, both monetary and otherwise. Ultimately, of course,
deployment will depend on the net software effects—the gains to
be had from additional software regulation—given the extant
legal protection. Thus, under this example, the location of point a
in Figure 1 is a function of these calculations. Again, this is the
central lesson of cyberlaw: Regulatory effect (here, total
protection) is the product of law and software.23
B. Dynamic Effects
Fleshing out this basic framework requires a few more
details. Perhaps the most important and most straightforward of
these observations is that the law-software interface is
profoundly dynamic.24 That conditions change, of course, is
unremarkable. What makes the dynamic effects of the modern
regulatory environment noteworthy is the interrelationship
between the two regulatory modes; as described above, the
complementary relationship implies that changes along one
dimension will (certainly over the long term) yield changes in the
other.25 From a policy perspective, this observation is crucially
important: It means that policy adjustments in the digital
context cannot merely be contemplated as one-dimensional
changes (or paradigmatically to legal scholars, as changes in the
legal environment). A complete policy proposal or analysis in this
arena cannot afford to overlook the dynamics of the law-software
relationship. That is, a proposal for legal change is incomplete
without predictions concerning the software response to such a
change: As noted above, it is the product of law and software
effects that determines the overall regulatory environment.

23. Note also that the response effects do not flow in only one direction.
Technological circumstances can drive legal changes.
24. Indeed, this dynamism—driven primarily by technological (software) changes—
is fundamentally why the relationship between law and technology is so evidently
important in this area of the law, while it garners relatively less attention in other areas.
25. Obviously, there are quite likely to be short-term effects where responses to
change in one regulatory mode are small to nonexistent. Given the nature of the
legislative and judicial systems, one can expect these transitional effects to have more
significance in slowing legal changes in response to software developments than viceversa.
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Consider, for example, Figure 2, depicting changes in
conditions.
Figure 2. The Interplay Between Regulatory Effects

Figure 2 generally describes a change in legal regulatory effects
(a decrease from 4 to 2, for example, when the law reduces a class
of ownership rights), and explores the implications of various
technological responses. Points b, c, d, and e describe a range of
possible software responses, each yielding a very different overall
regulatory environment. Condition B is the case where there are
no long-term software effects, perhaps because of the high cost of
the software regulatory mode; the appropriate software may not
meaningfully exist, or for example, it may be too inflexible to be
26
useful. In this case, total regulatory effect reduces from 8 in
Condition A (2 x 4) to 4 in Condition B (2 x 2). Given a utilitarian
model, one would thus expect a change in the output or
development of the protected or regulated good in Condition B;
for example, if the regulatory environment for music or movies
changed, one would expect a change in output. This could be
26. A bit of foreshadowing: Another possibility for Condition B, which I discuss
more fully in Part II.D below, is that the legal regulation directly affects the quantity or
nature of the software regulation, which I describe as legal preemption.
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either a positive or negative change, depending on a variety of
assumptions about the development environment. For purposes
of the illustration here, the direction and magnitude of the
output-effects are unimportant.
Condition C in Figure 2 describes the circumstance where
software effects increase at least marginally in response to the
decreasing legal regulatory effects. For example, the expansion of
“fair use” exceptions to copyright infringement might yield an
increased reliance on DRM-based solutions. This increase in
software effects in Condition C, however, does not make up for
the reduced legal effects, and the overall regulatory effects drop
to 6 (3 x 2). As above, one should expect a change in output.
Condition D illustrates an increase in software effects of a
magnitude that renders no net change in the regulatory
environment. Here, law and software are roughly fungible, at
27
least from a net regulatory effects perspective. There should be
little, if any, change in overall output in the shift from Condition
A to Condition D.
Condition E describes an unlikely—but not implausible—
scenario: The reduction in legal effects prompts a technological
response of such magnitude that it actually increases the overall
regulatory effect. This could occur, for example, if the increase in
resources devoted to research and development (R&D) of
software regulatory techniques (spurred by the drop in legal
effects) yielded a breakthrough in cost effectiveness, allowing
greatly increased deployment of software mechanisms. Perhaps a
reduction in the legal force of copyright law spurred R&D into
DRM systems that enabled huge advances in effectiveness to be
28
made.
The point of working through each of the conditions in
Figure 2 is to illustrate the critical attention that must be paid to
the law-software interface in the new regulatory context. Without
an understanding of whether the software response point will be
b, c, d, or e, the best-laid policy plans seem likely to go awry. The
intertwined relationship of law and software demands careful
consideration of each. Code is not equivalent to law, a point that
matters crucially in the modern legal-policy environment.

27. As discussed in some additional detail below and elsewhere, they are clearly not
truly fungible even in this case. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 9.
28. An example might be “unbreakable” digital rights management (DRM) systems,
or even copy-protected CDs that work reliably. Note that Condition E could also occur
where cost-effective software responses are profoundly inflexible, essentially forcing
deployment of more effective protections.
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C. A Few Implications of Software Regulation
Understanding the basic framework developed above leads
naturally to at least two important observations. The first is
dynamism: The analysis of policy options in the cyberspace
context will necessarily be dynamic in nature, requiring
consideration of not only (for example) legal adjustments, but
also predicting the responsive effects such changes will stimulate
in software regulation. Further, because of the nature of
technological change, even stable law-software equilibria are
unlikely to remain so permanently.
The second observation, and the one central to this Essay, is
that policy development in this context must consider both the
desired net regulatory effects—for example, how much real
protection to offer copyright owners—as well as the appropriate
mechanism—the mixture of law and software. That is, law and
software both regulate, but they are far from the same: they
regulate in very different ways, are controlled differently (if at
all) by traditional governmental authorities, and have quite
different effects. Regulation in the digital era has an additional
dimension, and the location of the law-software equilibrium may
well be as important as the overall regulatory effect.
Indeed, as I have argued at length elsewhere, there is good
reason to conclude that the overreliance on software code as a
regulatory mechanism is not socially beneficial. The basic
features of software code include:
• Preprogramming. Software regulation operates in a
relatively fixed, rigid fashion in determining regulatory
outcomes. The programmed algorithm is followed without
deviation; circumstances outside the scope of the
programmer’s imagination, for example, are not considered.
• A narrow range of inputs. Software regulatory
mechanisms use a predetermined—and typically narrow—
range of inputs in implementing the regulatory rules. The
quantity, scope, and nature of these inputs are often
significantly constrained by the creativity of the
programmer, the complexity or sophistication of the
software itself, or the environment in which it operates.
• Self-containment. The point here is obvious: Softwareimplemented regulations are free-standing mechanisms and
do not generally require recourse to other institutional
29
players for enforcement and rule determinations. This
29. This is not to say that software regulation will not access external resources,
such as databases, for information or assistance. Rather, the observation is that software
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contrasts with more typical legal regulation, which
generally requires recourse to other institutions or
players—courts, arbitrators, prosecutors, regulatory
bodies—for decisionmaking related to enforcement.
• Marginal costlessness. Software regulatory operations are
generally unaffected by the quantity of use.

Of course, these features of software regulation may look
like just that—features. Software offers a reliable, unwavering,
relatively simple, and, at least potentially, inexpensive means to
implement regulations. And yet these same features also have
serious negative implications, including the lack of regulatory
“safety valves,” the elimination of marginal enforcement costs,
and the potentially troubling public effects of software scalability.
1. Software-Based Regulation Lacks Regulatory Safety
Valves. Even under legal schemes that demand little or no
intervention on the part of third-party regulatory institutions,
such as property-backed contracts, there nonetheless exist a
number of safety valves that ensure that private arrangements
conform to acknowledged boundaries of social practice. These
safety valves can be explicit; examples include the doctrine of
unconscionability in contract law (which serves to ensure that
agreements are entered into voluntarily), unfair competition law
(which serves to ensure that private dealings do not stifle the
functioning of the market), and even issues of broader social
values, such as principles of nondiscrimination. Or they can be
less formal, such as the restraint encouraged by public
enforcement of contract law, which may subject the author to
unwanted publicity. By obviating the need to seek recourse from
third-party enforcement institutions—such as courts or
regulators—software regulation can “fly under the radar,”
avoiding the oversight, both formal and informal, that occurs in
even the least interventionist forms of legal regulation, such as
property backed contractual relationships. This in turn implies
that the typical forces that, in effect, tend to normalize what
otherwise appears to be purely private dealings will have
substantially less impact where software is concerned.
2. Software
Regulation
Can
Eliminate
Marginal
Enforcement Costs. It is axiomatic that the enforcement of legal
rights will not occur where the enforcement costs outweigh the
expected gains.30 While enforcement costs are often viewed as a
mechanisms inherently combine information collection, rule analysis, and enforcement.
30. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960)
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social drag, their function of allowing for some low-level
violations of rights can be in many cases beneficial; hence, the
concept of “efficient breach” in contract law. This effect of
enforcement costs is especially well understood in the area of
intellectual property, where allowing the broadest possible
dissemination of intellectual creations—consistent with
maintaining appropriate development incentives—is a core
value.31
In the software regulation context, marginal enforcement
costs are essentially zero. Thus, one can predict with confidence
that enforcement costs will not be accounted for—they do not
exist—and that the effects noted above will not be realized.
3. Software Regulation May Scale Poorly. While, as a
general matter, software scales well—its behavioral features
remain unchanged as the quantity of activity increases—the
scaling features of software may have potentially troubling public
effects. For one thing, software regulation is likely to become
increasingly vulnerable to countermeasures as the scale of its use
32
increases; it is well established that popular or widely used
software most encourages the sort of research that would either
reveal latent bugs in the software or develop effective
countermeasures.33 Further, software regulation is unlikely to
fail gracefully. Once bugs or countermeasures are discovered, the
effectiveness of the particular regulatory mechanism is

(asserting that the “rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in
the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs
which would be involved in bringing it about”).
31. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001–02 (2003) (noting the tension
between an incentive to produce and the desire to promote creativity and invention).
32. This situation is exacerbated by an institutional tendency to underreport
potential defects at the performance testing stage prior to release. See, e.g., H. Jeff Smith
& Mark Keil, The Reluctance to Report Bad News on Troubled Software Projects: A
Theoretical Model, 13 INFO. SYS. J. 69, 70 (2003) (describing how software developers and
project managers are often unwilling to report the actual status of a “troubled project”);
Lisa Liberty Becker, Telling the Truth Can Be Hazardous to Your Job, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 6, 2003, at G9 (observing the tendency to dismiss or minimize bad news in the
quality assurance context). See generally RTI, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INADEQUATE
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SOFTWARE TESTING (2002) (studying the impact of inadequate
software testing on the economy).
33. See, e.g., Christopher Jones, Internet Hacking for Dummies, WIRED NEWS, Feb.
20, 1998, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,10459,00.html. Eric Raymond
famously made a similar point in the context of the open source movement, noting that
“‘[g]iven enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.’” ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND
THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY
41 (1999); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 434–36 (2002).
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substantially diminished.34 This phenomenon—that software
becomes increasingly vulnerable to sudden (even catastrophic)
failure as its scale increases—again suggests that software is an
unstable regulatory device.
Combining the law-software framework with a recognition
that high levels of software regulation could be unfavorable
implies strongly that one goal (or at least consideration) of
regulation in the digital environment should be to limit (or at
35
least control) the quantity of software-based regulation.
D. Software Regulation and the Choice of Legal Rules:
Legal Preemption
In other related work, I have noted that where a regulatory
objective is to limit the quantity of software-based enforcement in
the overall regulatory environment, the use of property rules (as
opposed to liability rules) is likely to be (at least weakly) favored.
The flexibility, power, and scale of property rules enable
participants in the marketplace to tailor a legal regime to meet
rapidly changing circumstances.36 This Essay seeks to explore
another form of legal rule, one that is neither property nor
liability but instead directly controls the law-software
equilibrium. I call this type of rule legal preemption.37
Analytically, legal preemption is relatively straightforward:
the use of the power of law to limit (or remove) the effect of
software regulation. Obviously, this technique can take several
forms, ranging from an outright ban on certain technologies,38 to

34. See Dan Verton, Tech Consortium Created to Improve Software Reliability,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 20, 2002, at 12 (noting that unreliable software costs companies
over $175 billion per year to repair); see also Building a Better Bug-Trap, ECONOMIST,
June 21, 2003, Technology Quarterly, at 15. See generally RTI, supra note 32 (discussing
the effect that low-quality software has on the market, and the need for a software testing
infrastructure that prevents the release of such software). Additionally, efforts to repair
vulnerable or defective software systems are typically problematic. See George V. Hulme,
Quality First: Companies Pay Up to Plug Holes, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 20, 2002, at 38
(observing that hackers outpace the repair efforts of security administrators); Douglas
Schweitzer, Emerging Technology: Patch Management, Patch Me If You Can!, NETWORK
MAG., Aug. 2003, at 40 (stating that software patches are generally expensive to install on
large networks, frequently get released with minimal testing, and often have unintended
consequences such as causing other programs to crash).
35. Complete elimination of software regulation in the modern regulatory
environment is impractical.
36. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 491.
37. See id. at 484–88 (discussing legal preemption in the cyberlaw context, and its
role as a form of legal regulation).
38. An example of this is the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a) (2000), which defines the range of permissible operations for “digital audio
recording device[s]” that fall within the scope of the Act.
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enforced standardization,39 to manipulating incentives, to
developing and deploying either desired or undesired forms of
software regulation. The different forms of legal preemption may
be used individually or as a mixture. (As discussed below, the
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions are an example of multiple
forms of legal preemption in action.)
It should also be noted that legal preemption is not entirely
a creature of the Internet: Regulators in many contexts have
attempted to use the direct regulation of technology to affect the
overall regulatory-marketplace environment. An outright ban on
theft-enabling technologies, such as cable descramblers, is an
extreme example.40 A somewhat more subtle example is the use
of prescribed efficiency and safety standards to regulate the
automobile market.41 The point here is that, in an era in which
traditional legal leverage is waning, and more “technological”
regulatory opportunities are emerging, we are likely to see an
increase in the use of legal preemption in the modern online
environment.
From a regulatory toolbox perspective, the advantages of
42
legal preemption are clear. Most importantly, it provides a
vehicle by which the law can directly affect the law-software
equilibrium point.43 Instead of attempting to predict the
44
technological response to a legal change, legal preemption has a
far more predictable effect. Additionally, a legal preemption
strategy—by seeking to “freeze” (or at least slow) the relevant
software-regulatory developments—can add stability and
certainty to an area of regulation. Finally, because legal
preemption does not directly affect the substantive level of
regulation (though, as noted above, it can clearly have an
important effect) this approach may bring political advantages.
But there are also potential concerns with a legal
preemption approach. One potential problem is with feasibility.
While in theory it should be possible to directly address virtually
39. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mandates
various technical standards relating to digital broadcast television. See Edmund L.
Andrews & Joel Brinkley, The Fight for Digital TV’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at
F1.
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000).
41. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2000) (establishing average fuel economy standards);
§ 30111 (discussing safety standards for motor vehicles).
42. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 492–93 (“[T]he goal of a rule of legal preemption is
fixing . . . the corresponding regulatory effects of software.”).
43. Id. at 485–86 (“[T]hese supportive regulations serve to stabilize the lawsoftware equilibrium point by reducing the incidence of at least some forms of antiregulatory code.”).
44. See supra Part II.B.
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any software regulation with a legal rule, the rapid pace of
development and inherent uncertainty involved in modern
technology at least raise questions about the practicability of this
approach. An additional problem with this approach is the fact
that the pace of legal change (whether by legislation or judicial
decision) typically moves comparatively slowly and often involves
institutional actors whose competence in modern technologies is,
to say the least, not assured.45
A second potential problem is that the costs of error in legal
preemption might be unusually high. The direct manipulation of
technology could serve to “lock-in” an unfortunate set of
circumstances, could forestall developments that might lead to
more socially beneficial arrangements or even have more general
unintended spillover effects on technological change. For
example, a legal rule barring peer-to-peer technologies can be
predicted to: (1) favor the current incumbent distributors in the
digital media business, together with their (arguably
inappropriate) business models; (2) substantially slow the
current transition in digital media distribution models, delaying
more efficient forms of this business; and (3) dissuade some
investments into peer-to-peer and related technologies for fear of
legal liability in the future.
Despite these potential downsides, which are significant and
highly plausible, there is good reason to expect that the
policymakers of the future will turn to legal preemption
techniques with increasing enthusiasm. First, as noted above,
legal preemption is perhaps the most obvious way to solve the
major regulatory challenge of our time: the shift in power from
legal code to software code. Second, for lawmakers in an era
where traditional, sovereign-state-based government is becoming
increasingly marginalized, legal preemption is an attractive way
to reposition themselves at the forefront of regulatory activity.
III. RECASTING THE DMCA
This Part argues that the anticircumvention provisions of
the DMCA are a prescient example of legal preemption—a
harbinger of what is likely to be an important mode of regulation
in the digital era. By directly addressing the regulatory
technology in digital media markets, the DMCA is an effort by

45. See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster, Using Antitrust Law to Advance and
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 573 (2002) (preferring
specialized agencies to generalist courts that may lack expertise necessary to understand
complex economic and technological issues surrounding digital distribution of music).
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lawmakers to exert control over the law-software interface in one
of the most rapidly-changing areas of the economy.
The DMCA is a particularly important example of legal
preemption
not
only
because
of
its context.
The
anticircumvention rules have features which make them an
interesting case study into this emerging regulatory technique.
For example, as discussed below, the DMCA both suppresses
technology (anticircumvention technology) as well as encourages
technology (access control technology, or DRM): an effort to shift
the law-software interface using both the carrot and the stick.
Further, and perhaps most importantly, the DMCA is likely to
limit the incentives for an “arms race” in DRM (and anti-DRM)
technologies, thus effectively restraining the development and
deployment of DRM. Indeed, for those who have concerns about
the social benefits of DRM and related software-based regulatory
technologies, the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA
might be a positive step rather than a negative; it may well be
that the DMCA should be understood as a law that moderated
the growth of DRM in a critical area.
This Part continues as follows. First, the case is briefly made
as to why the anticircumvention provisions are best understood
as legal preemption. Second, the DMCA’s dual approach—both
encouraging and suppressing software regulation—is discussed.
Finally, the way that the DMCA in effect limits the growth of
DRM is outlined.
A. Anticircumvention as Legal Preemption
The most relevant of the DMCA’s anticircumvention
provisions are codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201, and read in part:
(a) Violations Regarding Circumvention of Technological
Measures.—
(1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title. . . .
....
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing . . . ;
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(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose
or use other than to circumvent . . . ; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in
concert with that person with that person’s knowledge
for use in circumventing . . . .

....
(b) Additional Violations.—
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing protection . . . ;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose
or use other than to circumvent protection . . . ; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in
concert with that person with that person’s knowledge
46
for use in circumventing protection . . . .

Broadly, the anticircumvention provisions prohibit the use,
development, or distribution of technologies which are designed
to “circumvent” (e.g., hack, crack, or break) access control
systems (or DRM). There are a couple of important points here.
First, the anticircumvention provisions squarely address
47
technology, not copyright. That is, the terms of the rules are
related to copyright only in the sense that the “circumvention”
that is prohibited is one which voids an access control on a
copyrighted work. Otherwise, copyright laws—the rights,
limitations, and remedies afforded owners and the public—are
not implicated.
Second, the anticircumvention rules do not generally affect
the users of copyrighted work. By their nature, these
technologies are likely to be rather esoteric, the province of
48
sophisticated computer users. Thus, the quantity of users of a

46.
47.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2000).
See JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM § 2.07[1] (2005) (“Section 1201 . . . is not part of copyright law and was never
intended to be so. . . . Its focus is . . . entirely on access to copyrighted
works. . . . Copyright law has never, and does not now, prohibit unauthorized access to
copyright works.”).
48. See, e.g., Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age:
The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT.
L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2001) (“[T]he new anti-circumvention laws prevent sophisticated users
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copyrighted work that are implicated by the anticircumvention
provisions will be small. Also, note that the relevant provisions of
the DMCA do not prohibit any particular use of the copyrighted
work, irrespective of whether DRM was circumvented. Thus, the
overwhelming majority of users will be in the same position after
the DMCA as before it.
Therefore, because these provisions of the DMCA (1) directly
address technologies, their creation, and their distribution; (2) do
not directly alter the underlying copyright balance between
creators and users (e.g., the substance of the copyright law is not
changed); and (3) do not implicate the vast majority of the users
of a copyright work (even one which is protected by DRM), the
DMCA is not really a law about copyright. It is instead a law
about technology. More specifically, it is a law that seeks to
define the relationship between the legal code and software code.
The anticircumvention rules are a clear example of legal
preemption—the use of the law to (try to) control the code.
B. Encouragement and Suppression of Software Regulation
Even beyond the fact of legal preemption, the DMCA’s basic
structure has an interesting feature: it simultaneously
suppresses and encourages technology. That is, on the one hand
it encourages the deployment of “access control” technologies on
copyrighted works—without them, any extra rights or remedies
from the anticircumvention provisions are unavailable. On the
other hand, it prohibits the use, development, or distribution of
“circumvention” technologies.49 Thus, the DMCA can be
understood as trying to shift the law-software equilibrium for
copyrighted goods generally in favor of software regulation,
though it does so in two ways: by increasing the amount of
software code that is deployed and by prohibiting antiregulatory
code. The expectation is plainly that the net result here will be
an increase in software regulation—and in that sense, at least a
potential increase in overall regulatory effect because the DMCA
does not change the underlying substantive legal rights.
C. The Plot Twist: How the DMCA Might Limit DRM
From the above discussion, it seems abundantly clear that
the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA are a form of legal
preemption—their goal is to increase the net effects of software
regulation in the digital copyright regime. Thus far, the proffered
from bypassing the technology.” (emphasis added)).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).

(6)WAGNERG2

1126

12/1/2005 10:35 AM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[42:4

conceptualization of the DMCA has yielded new insights, but the
conventional wisdom about its origins and goals (as an additional
grant of protection to the media-content creation industry) has
been largely upheld.50
And yet there is an important additional feature to these
legal rules, a feature that may, in fact, change the way we think
about the DMCA in a more fundamental way. In its structure,
the anticircumvention rules may effectively limit the incentives
to create ever-stronger DRM solutions. It does so in the way that
DRM technologies are described in § 1201 as a “technological
51
measure that effectively controls access.” The key phrase here is
“effectively controls,” which has been interpreted (correctly, given
the legislative context) to establish a low bar for the “strength” of
the DRM, or its resistance to being hacked.52 This low bar is, I
think, crucial to this aspect of the DMCA. By setting a low bar for
the effectiveness of DRM technologies, Congress provides
incentives to content owners to meet that low bar—at which
point these additional incentives disappear. In other words, the
DMCA requires only somewhat weak DRM systems to qualify for
the protection against anticircumvention technologies; once that
threshold is reached, the law provides no additional rewards for
further sophistication. Of course, there may well be other,
nonlegal, incentives that point towards stronger DRM, such as a
response to more effective attacks or the desire to structure
transactions in a different way. But the point here is that when
you put together these two aspects of the DMCA’s
anticircumvention provisions—(1) the low bar required for a
content owner to receive protection and (2) the direct suppression
of anticircumvention technologies—the net effect of the law will
likely do three things. First, it will encourage the development
and deployment of (relatively weak) DRM. Second, it will at least
moderate the incentives to engage in an “arms race” for stronger
DRM. Third, it will significantly suppress the incentives to use,
develop, and distribute anticircumvention technologies of any
kind.

50. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 422–25 (1999)
(noting that the anticircumvention provisions were a response to lobbying by the media
industry).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
52. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441–42 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that merely because a technological measure “was so easily penetrated” does not
indicate that it does not “‘effectively control[] access’” within the meaning of
§ 1201(a)(2)(A) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000))).

(6)WAGNERG2

2005]

12/1/2005 10:35 AM

RECONSIDERING THE DMCA

1127

This suggests that one real possibility for the long-term
effects of the DMCA is that it will slow or stabilize the
development of DRM technologies in the digital media space.
This is perhaps counterintuitive, given that the DMCA itself
purports to support and encourage the deployment of DRM. But
counterintuitive or not, this aspect seems to be present. And
while it is far too early to pronounce a verdict on the legacy of
these provisions of the DMCA, it may be that the lasting
contribution of the DMCA to the copyright law is as a set of rules
that stabilized, moderated, and encouraged relatively weak forms
53
of DRM.
IV. CONCLUSION: OR, HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE DMCA
I suggest that the conventional wisdom about the DMCA—
as a simple, politically-driven “giveaway” of valuable rights to the
content industries—misses both the real goal of the law as well
as its importance in illuminating an emerging regulatory trend.
The DMCA is fundamentally about the way that technology
regulates, rather than a law about copyright. And understanding
this point is important, both for our understanding of the
copyright law, as well as for our thinking about the form and
function of law in the modern regulatory environment. Indeed,
the broader framework noted here is likely to have broad
applicability to contexts beyond the digital content business. As
software (and thus regulation-by-software) becomes increasingly
ubiquitous in areas such as telecommunications and media
creation and distribution, the relevance of analytic processes—
such as the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions—that address
both law and software will only increase.

53. Though the case is far from clear, there are good reasons to believe that “weak”
forms of DRM might be a better solution than either “strong” or “no” forms. For an
argument that the “leaky” nature of the copyright law is an essential feature, see Wagner,
supra note 31, at 1010–16.

